because of Pearl Harbor US had to drop nuclear bombs on civilian pop. of Japan...

[Boboulas]

Shakur remember that Gar is 1 side, a plausable one imho. Have a read of Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, has a large use of Japanese archives.

[messinjure]

Salute to the resiliant people of Japan. to go through 2 a bombs and still come out of it with wonderous technological and social achievements is a testimony to their cultural strength.

[1871]

The Potsdam Declaration required an unconditional surrender. The Japanese did not give an unconditional surrender.

They did not pursue peace which an unconditional surrender when it was eventually made, secured.

Peace is not surrender and a conditional surrender is not an unconditional surrender.

[shakur420]

(12-09-2011 01:20 AM)Boboulas Wrote:  Shakur remember that Gar is 1 side, a plausable one imho. Have a read of Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, has a large use of Japanese archives.

Yeah, for sure. Except his explanation reveals quotes, fugures and cables from official sources that are usually ignored by the other "side". When I started looking into it the other day, it was the sheer number of sources this guy's pulled out that really hits you in the face. That's why I posted this link, it's a good explanation of a lot of the discussion surrounding the scholarship. Whether you wanna interperet some of the things as important or not, credible or whatever, is up to you.



As for Postdam and unconditional surrender, lol.

Quote:The second decision, which is widely discussed, and everyone understands it who has studied the literature is the following. Every member of the U.S. government and the British government, with one exception I’m going to come back to, says, If you want the war to end you must tell them that they can keep the Emperor, explicitly. A proclamation has been drafted. It was unanimously agreed by all officials at the time, shortly thereafter one of the officials changes, and it is the famous Potsdam Proclamation. Some of you who know this story will know that a proclamation was issued at the Potsdam Conference. It is a warning to Japan to surrender or else. It’s a very general warning. I’ve just talked about that warning. One of the questions was when it would be released, and a decision was made to release it at the last minute rather than give them time. But the most important element of that warning was whether or not it would say explicitly, You can keep the Emperor, we’re not going to harm him. The draft Potsdam Proclamation recommended to the President in Paragraph 12, it’s one of the very few technical things you ought to take back from this talk, Says, recommended by the all Cabinet officials involved, essentially, You can keep the Emperor. At the Potsdam meetings, once the atomic bomb was tested, under the advice of Secretary of State James F. Byrnes and against the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the British military leaders, Prime Minister Churchill, every other major American leader, Paragraph 12 is eliminated. So that the Potsdam Proclamation as it was put out on July 26 does not contain any assurances for the Emperor. And in so doing, we know, from many diaries, the President fully understood it could not be accepted. This warning proclamation could not be accepted, and it was understood, well documented, that it could not be accepted. As one historian- scholar, Leon Sigal, in a book called Fighting for the Finish, puts it, it was put out as a propaganda device. It had nothing to do with a real warning that anyone could accept. So that’s the second decision that’s made.

http://flagindistress.com/2011/08/hirosh...old-myths/

[1871]

Well that quote just proves Alperovitz is wrong. Every Government member did NOT say that the Japanese should keep the Emperor. Clearly the Japanese did not want peace as their continuing hostilities and war crimes following the Potsdam Declaration showed. Officials
at the meeting where Japan rejected the Potsdam Declaration noted the Japanese rejection. I read that link - he doesn't come to a conclusion either.lol.

Really it doesn't matter if the Japanese found terms 'acceptable' - they were told and they had no choice.
They underestimated American resolve. One thing becomes clear - and that is that once an unconditional surrender had not been submitted to events followed like the fall of dominoes. There's also enough archival Japanese evidence to show that the Japanese were prepared to fight to the last man woman and child if there had been a ground invasion.

Why, having the atom bomb, and knowing the Soviets were to enter the war should the US even had the Potsdam Declaration? They could have just bombed Japan back into the Stone age.

The idea that they wanted to 'awe' the Soviets has no credibility. The Soviets had their own espionage system and would have developed a nuclear system regardless - they would have laughed at the idea that thus 'awed' them. It made no difference whatsoever to US/Soviet 'relationships/animosities' anyway.

[shakur420]

^Well, among other conclusions, the guy with this essay does say it seems likely to him that sending a message to the Soviets was a factor. Anyways, the reason I like his explanation is that he covers a lot of the shit we're saying. He references works by what he calls the "revisionist" camp and the "pro-bomb" side. His own opinion is irrelevant, you gotta decide for yourself.

Also, I think it's weird that a guy who's work has been attacked so heavily would bring up these sources if they weren't solid. The journals, comments and stuff. I don't think he would talk about a "consensus" among historians if this could easily be refuted. It's not like they haven't tried.

[1871]

http://unjobs.org/authors/sadao-asada

---

Hasegawas long essay here:

http://japanfocus.org/-Tsuyoshi-Hasegawa/2501

I've read a discussion between Hasegawa and Asada but I want to find Asadas response to Hasegawa.

Hasegawa did not say that he did not believe that dropping the bomb was not a contributing factor in the decision to end the war but contends it was not the decisive factor - which he puts down to the Soviet defeat of the Japanese in Manchuria. His quotes from Japanese Generals are interesting but the defintion of actively seeking peace is not supported by the actual comments they make. It more seems that the Japanese were attempting to broker a deal which was rebuffed by the Soviets.

[shakur420]

I don't understand the point of that link. Out of the first 8 results, 4 don't work.

2 are this:
http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/...dtable.pdf

1 is this:
http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/153_wilson.pdf

Both discredit your claims. This next one is useless, it's a course outline or something (mentions Asada's book once as course material).
http://www.unc.edu/depts/uc/AB/10-24-07/ASIA150.pdf

p.s. "Decisive" is an important word. It means the decision to surrender was based on the Soviet invasion, a point Alveropitz keeps stressing. Maybe because this was well known by the Amercans who supposedly dropped the bombs to "end the war and save lives". lol, the first link I got up here, the one that was given twice in your search link, covers Hasegawa's book.

[1871]

The link with the Alperovitz and Hasegawa discussion? I'll rectify the link shortly. I want to put up the links to the sources that there are - that's if you're not averse to considering both sides of the argument.

The interesting thing about the Hasegawa essay is that the quotes he cites contradict not only the claims made by Alperovitz - read the quotes by Japanese Generals and chiefs of staff - the intention clearly is of a resolve to fight on and NOT to surrender. Not only had they made this resolve among the army ranks but also, were a ground invasion to take place, that civilians were to fight on - intact, in the event, Japanese 'civilians' were to be combatants.

As for the decisive factor being the Soviet invasion: Sadao Asadas research has disproved Hasegawas claim. Citing low level officials is one thing - it is whether those officials determine the actual policy, ie: whether their views prevail ie: the views and policy and decisions of those people actually in power who can make a difference. In Japans case this is the individuals who, with the power structure of the Emperor - which revisionists have said needed to be acceded to - are known as the 'big six' and whether their decisions from the Potsdam Declaration onwards support or disprove the contention that Japan were truly seeking peace as opposed to merely bstgainingvto keep power and territories gained through invasion,mass murder, rape and the most heinous war crimes. This was not even a nation who abided by the Geneva Convention and whose atrocities on a mass scale are notorious.

Both the practice and lack of willingness to surrender, despite obviously day by day losing the war, as well as numerous statements contrary to the idea of surrende (in fact stressing the need to 'fight to the death') from bothe soldiers and Japans top military rulers during this supposed 'attempt at surrender' completely exposes the FALSE 'seeking peace' claim - as opposed to maintaining the territories they conquered and their imperial power structure. Interestingly enough the 'peace' purportedly being pursued (this despite the accounts by Japanese army commanders that they would not surrender and would fight to the last man) was not backed up by any troop redeployment from Manchuria to Japan in the lead up to the Soviet Japanese war in Manchuria on August 9th. We are also asked to believe that, despite continued Japanese troop presence in Manchuria and despite the refusal of the Soviets to meet with the Japanese on 8th August that between the Japanese rejection of the Potsdam Declaration, that the Japanese, 'desperate for peace' did not redeploy from Manchuria or make any declaration of surrender between those dates:

26th July Potsdam Declaration
28th July Japanese Rejection
8th -9th August Commencement of Soviet offensive in Manchuria.

^
Fighting and hostilities not only continued on these dates but offensives were engaged in by those who purportedly were 'seeking peace'

Statements by the Japanese refer to the use of 10,000 kamikaze planes for the defence of Kyushu and the Japanese mainland.

Hasegawas counterfactual claim that the bomb was not the decisive factor as well as the whole revisionist tale falls down like a pack of cards from the actual evidence from the very man they thought the Americans should recognise - the Emperor - in his unconditional surrender speech.

[shakur420]

Ok, the "low level" people, weren't they the ones appointed by the emperor to seek out a peace deal? If so, doesn't it hold more weight? I remember reading that somewhere, will try to find it if you want. Also, from what I understand, it wasn't just the emperor, but like in Egypt for example, the military played a big part in decision making. Hasegawa's book covers that though, I read, why the military came around, largely due to the Soviet threat.



The link, nah, I meant this one. Posted by mistake?

(12-11-2011 09:26 PM)1871 Wrote:  http://unjobs.org/authors/sadao-asada